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EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL-MYTH OR MOTTO?
JomH R. BAir
Problems of federalism have perpetually harassed nations
which have seen fit to adhere to a system of dual sovereignty.
Dichotomies have arisen along the lines of economic and admin-
istrative management. Our country has been able to heal most
of the state-federal government lesions; perfection, however, has
never been attained.
Centralization of the United States is de facto; Jeffersonians
have been forced to genuflect to the Hamiltonians. The states
are supreme in very few fields. One of their rare areas of
supremacy lies in the administration of their own criminal law.
Yet, even in this area, the states are not omnipotent. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has played an ever increasing
role as overseer of state conduct. In the field, federal interven-
tion has illuminated the very important issue of federalism. The
clash is another addition to a lengthy historical list of American
problems in federalism.
A piercing of the surface tension, however, reveals that the
matter has ramifications and considerations above and beyond
the political. Essentially, the problem is one of determining what
is "fairness" in a criminal proceeding. What are the standards to
which the state must adhere? Primarily "fairness" refers to the
accused, but certainly, society has an interest which must be pro-
tected.
The federal government is bound by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the states by a similar clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Due process has been subject to a diversity of interpreta-
tion. It is, as is "fairness", a veritable generality. The judiciary
has been forced to give content to the term via case to case de-
cision. Cumulative decisions have made the term capable of
definition to a limited extent. The object of this paper is to dis-
play the role of the Supreme Court in defining and applying the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a standard
for the governing of state criminal proceedings-a standard which
is directed at making fairness mandatory in criminal proceedings.
Pre-History
Most of us hold the erroneous conception that due process
of law has had substantive content since King John stood beneath
the elm trees at Runnymeade in 1215. This fable must give way
to reality. Our great heritage of Anglo-American Law did not
abound in a due process of true meaning until a much later date.
This is especially true of due process as afforded in criminal pro-
ceedings.
Perusing English history, we find many irregularities. Not
until 1819 was trial by wager of battle abolished.' Centuries had
fled by before it was realized God was not always on the side of
simians whose only claim to innocence was the size of their
biceps. By 1827, one who stood mute in a criminal proceeding
was granted a plea of not guilty. Previously, one who did not
plead was considered to have announced his guilt.2 The right
to counsel was not freely bestowed upon defendants in felony
cases, other than treason, until 1835. 8 The protection in treason
cases may stem from Parliament's desire for self-perpetuation,
since those most subject to an accusation of treason were Par-
liament's members and benefactors. Four years before the grant-
ing of right to counsel, it was finally determined that the ac-
cused had the right to know the charges against him.4 Moreover,
until the nineteenth century, "the theoretical right to challenge
the jury was entirely lacking as the accused did not see the jury
list until the time of the trial.5
In 1864, the Maine legislature passed a statute which allowed
the accused to be a witness in his own behalf thus establishing
a landmark in our legal history.6 The disability was not cast off
in England until 1898. 7 Until 1907 in England there was not an
adequate system of review in criminal cases." In the United
159 George I, c. 46.
2 Statutes 7 and 8, George IV, c. 28.
3 Beany, The Right to Counsel, 9, 12 (1955).
4 Stephen, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 526 (1925).
5 Ihid.
6 See 2 Wigrnore, EVdence, Sec. 579 (3rd Ed. 1940).
7 Ibid.
8 0'Haloran, Development of the Right to Appeal in England in Criminal
Cases, 27 Can.B.Rev. 153 (1949).
States, the federal courts had little regimen over state criminal
procedure until 1868. The power to review, when constitutional
rights were involved, was inherent,9 but opportunity to review
had developed upon the Federal courts with something less than
regularity.'0
The development of federal control over state criminal pro-
ceedings was forecast by John Marshall's early decision in Cohens
v. Virginia." Yet Baron v. Baltimore,12 holding the Bill of
Rights applicable only to the federal government, forced
Marshall's opinion into abeyance for many years. Early
American history has produced little evidence that federal review
was necessary. A rough type of frontier justice had not been
beset by the exigencies of the twentieth century.
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; soon it
became the asylum of the Ahabs of industry who fled the eco-
nomic and social regulations of the states. The due process
clause of the Amendment formed the bulwark of American
capitalism. As of the moment, the states remained unfettered
in their administration of the criminal law. It was not until
nearly fifteen years had passed that a trickle of cases began to
come before the Supreme Court of the United States. These
early cases dealt particularly with the propriety of racial dis-
crimination in criminal proceedings.
In opposition, the advocates of "fair" criminal hearings
sought the sanctuary of the privileges and immunities clause of
9 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, Sec. 25, 1 Stat. 85; see Twitchel v. Comm,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868).
'o Today statutory authority is extensive in covering the matter. Congress
has created criminal and civil actions to enforce constitutional rights,
Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, Sees. 2, 3, 14 Stat. 27; Act of May 31, 1870,
c. 114, Secs. 17, 18, 16 Stat. 144; Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, Sees. 1, 2,
17 Star. 13. The essence of these are now to be found in 18 U.S.C. Sees.
241, 242, (1952) and Rev.Stat. Sees. 1979, 1980, (1875), 42 U.S.C. Sees.
1983, 1985 (1952). Further it is provided that certain species of criminal
cases might be removed from state to federal courts, Act of April 9,
1866, c. 31, Sec. 3, 14 Stat. 27; Act of May 11, 1866, c. 80, Sec. 3, 14 Stat.
46; Act of May 31, 1890, c. 114, Sec. 18, 16 Stat. 144. See 28 US.C. Sec.
1443 (1952) for crux of these Acts. Congress has also provided prisoners
in the custody of a state the remedy of habeas corpus when they are
held in violation of constitutional rights, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(1) (3)
(1952).
"16 Wheat. (U.S.) 264 (1821).
12 17 Pet. (U.S.) 243 (1833).
the Fourteenth Amendment by contending the Bill of Rights to
the Constitution should be included therein. However, the
Slaughter House cases'" and a host of subsequent decisions showed
their efforts to be futile.14
In 1879 and 1880, the Supreme Court reviewed three cases
involving discrimination in the composition of juries called for
duty in criminal trials. In Virginia v. Reeves,15 the Court upheld
the state tribunal; but in Strauder v. West Virginia,16 and Neal
v. Dela'ware,'" the Court intervened to prevent a threatened
denial of due process. A step forward had been taken; yet re-
pose once again recaptured progress and the Court chose to
hibernate. By 1896, the Court was content to gloss over the
errors of the states when composing their juries so as to exclude
racial minorities.' 8 It would appear that the Court had retreated
from a stand which was but a natural incident of the Civil War,
Emancipation, and the passage of constitutional amendments to
secure the rights of the Negro. Thus, in the aura of the twentieth
century, the states remained supreme within their province. In-
tervention by federal courts had been sporadic.
The Twentieth Century-History in the Making
As has been shown the years prior to the advent of the
twentieth century are but protozoan in development. Twentieth
century history is verily modern history; of such recent vintage
that our point of perspective is, at most, thirty years removed
from the actual events. In treating these modem developments,
the steps of the proceeding as they affect the accused shall be fol-
lowed in their approximate chronology.
A. Due Process: Requirement of Definiteness of Statutes
In all fields of law, it is well settled that a statute may be
13 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36 (1872).
14 Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172
(1899); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. (1908).
1 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
10 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
17 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
18 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
592 (1896).
so vague as to be void for not meeting the requirements of due
process. A recent instance will bear this out. In Professor Owen
Lattimore's celebrated case, a federal tribunal held the applicable
statutd void for vagueness, due to a nebulous demarcation of what
constitutes subversive activity.' 9 The postulate as applied by the
court was not novel.20
The Supreme Court of the United States has held numerous
statutes void for indefiniteness.2 ' Many of these statutes were
civil in nature, but not a few of them concerned the control of
crime. It is the latter with which this paper will be concerned.
As a basis for prognosis, it would appear proper to evolve a
rationale which bears consistency with the Supreme Court's de-
cisions. Reasoning from the a priori content of due process, it
is an accepted premise that the adjudication of one's rights re-
quires that such determination be governed by rules of an ob-
jective quality. Legislative rules must afford sufficient grounds
upon which the judge may rule upon questions of law and make
charges to the jury. It is the task of the legislature to formulate
these standards. Duly constituted and possessing facilities which
allow it to examine social needs and desires, the legislature is the
natural governmental functiohary to perform this task. The
judiciary is not the proper body to give content to a statute
which is but a skeleton.22
The statute, as well as informing the judge, must be suf-
ficient in allotting a means of guidance for the defense counsel.
However, meeting one criterion, would satisfy the other.23 While
serving as a guide to adjudication, it is imperative that the statute
'9 U.S. v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (1954).
20 The doctrine is early mentioned in ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445
(1904); and clearly recognized in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86 (1909). The first case of actual invalidation occurred in Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
21 In England statutes must be interpreted no matter how indefinite. See
Crois, A Treatise on Statute Law, (3rd Ed. 1923). This compares with
interpretations of the United States Constitution which is never voided
- for vagueness.
22See U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co, 255 U.S. 81 (1921); U.S. v. Reeves,
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
23See Boyce Motor Lines v. U.S., 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Manley v. Georgia,
279 U.S. 1 (1929).
perform the function of channeling conduct in futuro. That is,
setting a standard to which society may adhere.
When a statute has been challenged as being too vague, the
Supreme Court has posed the following test: 24 "If men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and
differ as to its application.., the statute must fall." 25 Applica-
tions of this test have been legion.
A New Jersey statute denominated as a gangster, any person
not engaged in gainful, lawful employment, who was known as
a habitual member of a gang consisting of more than two per-
sons; and who had been convicted in New Jersey or in any
other state of a crime. One considered a gangster under the
statute was subject to fine or incarceration at the whim of the
state.26 The Supreme Court, applying the common intelligence
test, was quick to point out the flaws of the statute. Nowhere
is there a legal definition of the word "gang", said the Court.
"Known to be a member of a gang",27 was held by the Court to
be insufficient wordage to apprise one of his status under the law.
The statute was a morass of ambiguity. No actual notice or
definity could be gleaned by a reading of it. In truth, the ac-
cused had no notice of what conduct would be considered crim-
inal. The statute clearly was antipedal to due process and had
to fall.
By contrast, one year later, the Court upheld a statute which
provided for the commitment of psychopathi6 personalities by an
action akin'tb a hinady proceeding. The statute had been con-
strued as including sexual offenders whose conduct was habitual.
Evidence of past conduct pointing to probable future conse-
quences was held to be a sufficient quantum of proof to being
the statute into play.as This decision would appear distinguishable
from Lanzetta v. New Jersey on the ground that the parties in-
volved in the Minnesota case were mental incompetents. As
24 Winters v. N.Y., 333 U.S. 507, 515, 518 (1948); Lanzetta v. N.J, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939); Champlain Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of
Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 242 (1932).
25 This test was originated in Connally v. General Construction Co, 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
2
6 Lanzetta v. NJ., 306 US. 451 (1939).
27 bid. at 455.
2 8 Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
notice to the accused is based on the premise that he could have
obviated past acts which he knew to be criminal, the requirement
is not applicable in this instance. The mental incompetents had
no voluntary choice. They could not have constrained their
conduct no matter how clearly the statute had givennotice and
set standards for activity.
Although prevailing, the "common intelligence" test is not
necessarily controlling. Intermittent decisions have established
that definiteness of a lesser degree may be allowed. Exemplary
of this, are the cases upholding statutes containing common law
verbage.29 In Winters v. New York,30 the Court stated 'that a
statute prohibiting the dispensing of "obscene" literature would
be constitutional; but held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting
the sale of periodicals which portrayed "deeds of bloodshed and
lust as to incite to crimes against the person." "Obscene, it
would appear, has a well settled common law definition readily
determinable by all. However, the New York statute which
was held unconstitutional would certainly seem to be directed at
the obscene. It can well be asked, is there any real distinction?
Although the "common intelligence" test seems to be the
norm, the Court has admitted to its impropriety in certain in-
stances. Thus, it would appear that in essence there are two
formulas. The first formula involves lay ability to interpret
statutes. The second is based on the discern of the legal tech-
nician.
Granting that the Supreme Court will hold unconstitutional
indefinite statutes, it is obvious that there are limitations to the
extent to which the Court will go. The Court will not stand
for semantic piracy on the part of the legislature, the prosecutor,
or the accused. Words will be viewed in the light of common
usage and experience. Conjecture will not efface experience.
.The Court will look to community experience, common usage,
prior judicial iriterpretation; and .eth- p- .1keinnt'fiQfois. Each
-of these etssenials will- be' 6xamined. from diiierse'perspectives.
The positions of judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, and accused
will all be used as vantage points from which an examination
will be made. True, personal philosophy has its part in the
29See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
0 333 US. 507 (1948).
process; this cannot be gainsaid. Yet, the Court in this particular
area has shown itself to be a guardian of fairness for both the
accused and the accuser.
B. The Accusation.
While making inroads on state sovereignty in other facets
of the criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court has been reticent
to infringe upon the mode of accusation. The Supreme Court
has stated that the function of the accusation is to furnish the
accused with a description of the charge against him with such
clarity as to make possible a defense. Further, the charge must
be made so that the accused might avail himself of a prior ac-
quittal or conviction in defense.31
Due process does not require presentment or indictment as
known to the common law of England. Various types of accusa-
torial methods are permitted and deemed consistent with due
process. The Supreme Court, long ago and many times since,
has held prosecution by information after preliminary examina-
tion is consistent with due process and the fundamentals of
justice.3 2 Filing of the information need not be preceded by
arrest or preliminary examination of the accused.33
Accusation may be by information, complaint, presentment,
or indictment; but, if by indictment, the grand jury must be
fairly constituted. Thus, an Alabama conviction was rescinded
by the Supreme Court when it was shown no Negro had ever
served on a jury within the county; and that in the particular
case, Negroes were discriminately precluded from service.34 The
opportunity to posit a defense to the charge is the prime objective
which the accusation must make possible. The Constitution of
the United States, nearly all state courts, and due process have
deemed this mandatory.35
1 U.S. v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953).32 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Brown v. New Jersey, 175
U.S. 172, 175 (1890); Graham v. W.Va., 224 U.S. 616, 627 (1912);
Jordan v. Mass, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
33 Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
34 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); see also Sheperd v. Florida, 341
U.S. 50 (1951).
s See In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948).
As long as the state procedure affords the defendant adequate
opportunity to defend, the mode of accusation will be upheld.
However, the charge must be the accusation upon which the
accused is tried. He may not be convicted of a crime totally
divorced from that with which he is originally charged.36 Such
a conviction would violate due process. But, with little exception,
it is readily discernible that the Supreme Court has given the
states carte blanche when instituting the action by accusation.
Seldom has the Court intervened. Truly, this is an area in which
state sovereignty has not been invaded to any appreciable extent.
C. The Police and Prosecution Before the Trial.
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his classic work on English
criminal law, relates one-half of a colloquy on the subject of
criminal procedure in India, the topic being the torture of
prisoners.
There is a great deal of laziness in it. It is far pleasanter
to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into
a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting
up evidence.3
The chronicles of history attest to the degradation perpe-
trated by the ancient Assyrians, the later Romans and the modem
Gestapo. With apologies it must be admitted that the problem
of the application of the third degree is not one which is purely
exotic. The "insulated chambers" of our forty-eight states have
witnessed more than a dearth of atrocities, committed by the
police and prosecution.
In the Anglo-American system, there is no formal procedure
for police inquisition. The "prefect" and "intendant" systems of
the Civil Law countries have never impressed our nation as fitting
for a democracy. Yet, the pre-trial conference as is known in the
usual civil case has another connotation in a criminal proceeding.
The law in no state provides for the inquisition of the accused by
the police. By statute or common law, it is mandatory that the
accused be taken before a magistrate with all celerity, so that the
charges against him may be tested by the judge. This required
36 Ibid.
S7 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. I, p. 442 (1883).
procedure is often flagrantly flouted by law enforcement authori-
ties.s It is the period between the "arrest", corporal restraint,
and trial of the accused in which the most malignant violations
of the concept of due process are perpetrated.
I. Self-Incrimination
In Twining v. New Jersey,8 9 the Supreme Court ruled that
neither current definition nor historical data required that the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment be encom-
passed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It would not be improper for the state to adopt a procedure in
which the privilege is unknown. Thus, a New Jersey judge was
allowed to charge the jury that they might draw an unfavorable
conclusion from the failure of the accused to speak in his own
behalf. This viewpoint was subsequently asserted in other deci-
sions of the Court.40 The Supreme Court felt that the privilege
against self-incrimination is not one so deeply ingrained in our
concept of fairness that it is indispensable. In the Snyder v.
Massacbusetts4 case, the Court flatly stated that the privilege
might be withdrawn by the state, and the accused be put upon
the stand as a witness for the state. Stronger language need not
be offered. The Court, in essence, has rejected the minority view
in Adamson v. California2 and has applied their "fair trial"
formula. Though the minority was only one less than the
majority in 1947, it has since dwindled due to the deaths of two
justices adhering to the minority opinion.43 No switch to the
minority view is within the range of accurate prediction. To the
contrary, no inkling foreshadows any change.
Although rejecting the inclusion of the self-incrimination
clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has found other
as For an interesting survey of police practice, see a note on ''Philadelphia
Police Practice and the Law of Arrest ' , 100.,U. of Pa. Law Rev. 1182
(1952).
89 211 US. 78 (1908).
4OPalko v. Connecticut, 305 US. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 ('1934).
41 Ibid.
42322 US. 46 (1947); See Fariman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment In-
corporate the Bill of Rights? 2 Stan.L.Rev. 5 (1949).
43 Ibid.
avenues which have been extended to protect an individual from
what amounts to self-incrimination.
II. Coerced and Otherwise Elicited Confessions
The year 1897 found the Supreme Court invalidating an in-
voluntary statement which was an integral part of a federal con-
viction. Thirty years passed before the Court invaded the
suzerainty of the states. In Brown v. Mississippi,45 a case reading
like a horror tale from the pen of Edgar Allan Poe, three Negro
defendants were subjected to indecencies virtually beyond com-
prehension. In the course of the police's gleaning of a confession,
two of the defendants had their backs flogged to shreds. The
other defendant was beaten unmercifully and then left hanging
from a tree until he was ready to confess. At the trial, a deputy
who supervised the activity, testified that the torture meted out
was "not too much for a NegrO. Not as much as I would have
done if it were left to me." 46 A Mississippi Supreme Court
Justice characterized the proceeding thusly:
The transcript reads more like the pages tom from some
medieval account than a record made within the confines
of a modem civilization which aspires to an enlightened
constitutional government.4 7
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of the United
States had this to say:
It would-be difficult to conceive of methods more
revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to pro-
cure the confessions of these petitioners; and the use of
the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction
and sentence was a clear denial of due process. 48
Following the murder of an elderly white man, local Florida
police herded together forty Negroes and began a questioning
marathon. The mass arrest was made without warrants and was
4 4Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
45 297 US. 284 (1936).
48 297 US. 273 at 294 (1936).
47 173 Miss. 542, 574, 161 So. 465, 470 (1935).
48 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 US. 278, 286 (1936).
completed within twenty-four hours of the murder. For six days,
the defendants, Chambers, Williamson, Davis, and Woodward
were questioned. Finally, after incessant grilling, Woodward
"cracked"; but this first confession was not acceptable to the
State's attorney. At last, all four men confessed their guilt after
another period of prolonged questioning. During their imprison-
ment the defendants were afforded no opportunity to consult
counsel, or to communicate with friends or family. At the trial
all but Chambers pleaded guilty. All were convicted of murder,49
Chambers on the basis of his own and his co-defendant's confes-
sion. After a hectic journey through the State courts, the case
reached the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court held that it might review the facts leading to the
confessions independently of the factors passed on by the jury
in rendering its verdict. Reversing the judgment, the Court said:
For five days petitioners were subject to interroga-
tions culminating in Saturday's (May 20th) all night
examination. Over a period of five days they steadily
refused to confess and disclaim guilt. The very circum-
stances surrounding their confinement and questioning
without any formal charges having been brought, were
such as to fill petitioners with terror and frightful mis-
givings. Some were practically strangers in the com-
munity; three were arrested in a one-room farm tenant
house which was their home; the haunting fear of mob
violence was around them in an atmosphere charged
with excitement and public indignation. From virtually
the moment of their arrest until their eventual confes-
sions they never knew just when anyone would be
called back to the fourth floor room, and there, sur-
rounded by his accusers and others, interrogated by
men who held their very lives-so far as these ignorant
petitioners could know-in the balance. The rejection of
petitioner Woodward's first "confession" given in the
early hours of Sunday morning, because it was found
wanting, demonstrates the relentless tenacity which
"broke" petitioners' will and rendered them helpless to
resist their accusers further. To permit human lives to be
forfeited upon confessions there obtained would make
49 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
the Constitutional requirement of due process a mean-
ingless symbol.r0
The individual's rights were vindicated except for the fact
that during the litigation, Chambers was placed in a Florida
insane asylum as a result of the protracted seven year ordeal.
In the same and next terms, the Court decided a similar
series of cases, and reached conclusions consistent with the
Chambers decision.51 In the fourth of the 1940-1941 series of
cases,52 White, an illiterate Negro, was taken into custody with
fifteen others in connection with the rape of a white woman.
No formal charges had been filed at the time of detention. White
was kept in jail for seven days, during which time Texas Rangers
subjected him to the third degree. The conviction was reversed
by the Supreme Court, but it helped White very little for, at the
remanded trial, the husband of the prosecutrix shot him to death.
The husband was indicted for murder. Testimony subsequently
arising in his trial revealed that the State's special prosecutor told
the accused, Cochran, he would never be convicted. The district
attorney concluding the prosecution pleaded for Cochran:
In my opinion the guilty party [Chambers] got justice
• . . If I were going into the jury room, I wouldn't
hesitate, I wouldn't stand back a minute in writing a
verdict of not guilty.53
The Court seemingly was reacting in the proper manner to
such vile activity in the states. Physical torture and the more
subtle methods of inducing terror were apparently anathema to
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It seemed
the Court was giving vent to a policy Which was almost retributive
of the macabre acts perpetrated by the police.
However, in Lisenba v. California5 the Supreme Court made
50 Ibid. at 239-240 (1940).
51Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 Us.
547 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941). In the latter case the
accused was stripped naked and forced to stand relatively immobile
all night.
V~2 White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
MHouston Post, June 17, 1941.
U 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
it clear that its rationale was something quite different. The case
was distinguishable from its predecessors on the ground that the
police conduct was not totally odious. The Court's opinion ex-
pressly rejected the theory that the exclusionary rule was to be
applied in all cases involving tainted confessions. Rather, the
Court stated that the illegality involved in evoking the confession
did not render it inadmissible. The Court was dilating its "fair
trial" theory:
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is
the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential
to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a
denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness
totally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be
of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.55
Lisenba had been detained in violation of the state statutes
which required that he be taken before a magistrate without delay
and that he subsequently be allowed to consult counsel. Under
detention, he had confessed, and the Court could see no evidence
pointing to an involuntary (coerced) confession. Lisenba's de-
tention was not protracted nor was he physically tortured. The
Court concluded its affirmance of Lisenba's conviction by an-
nouncing it would still quash convictions on the basis of coerced
confessions, but made it quite clear that not every illegal act is
precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus the Court's point of emphasis in the physical coercion
cases is clearly outlined in the Lisenba case. State courts should
not be polluted with evidence which belies any possibilty of
veracity being a factor in the final determination.
Until 1944 the Supreme Court decided each case, quering as
follows: Did the accused have a choice between remaining silent
and confessing? But in the case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee,ss the
Court adopted a new rationale by substituting social objectivity
for subjective tenacity. The 'new -concept interrogatively for-
mulated was as follows; Was the conduct of the prosecution and
police that which was of an "inherently coercive" nature? Was
the panoply in which the accused was placed more than likely
to produce a fabricated confession?
55 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
5 6 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
Petitioner Ashcraft was questioned for thirty-six consecutive
hours without respite. Held incommunicado and worked upon by
a bevy of officers, investigators, and lawyers performing in relays,
Ashcraft finally confessed. In reversing the state court the
Supreme Court concluded:
We think a situation such as that shown here by un-
contradicted evidence is so inherently coercive that its
very existence is irreconcilable with possession of mental
freedoms by a lone suspect against whom its full coercive
effect is brought to bear. It is inconceivable that a court
of justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open
to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays
to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-ex-
amination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an
effort to extract a "voluntary" confession. Nor can we,
consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold
voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same
thing away from the restraining influence of a public
trial in an open court room.57
Again, in Malinski v. New York, 58 a majority of the Court
hastened to protect the accused from mistreatment at the hands of
the police although their acts did not necessarily destroy the truth
of the confession. The facts were essentially as follows: Suspected
of murder, Malinski was arrested on his way to work on Friday,
October 23, 1942. He was not arraigned but was driven to the
Bossert Hotel in Brooklyn. On arrival at 8:00 A.M. he was
stripped and kept nude until 11:00 A.M. At thaf time he was
furnished a blanket to warm himself. He remained clothed solely
in the blanket until 6:00 P.M. Between 5:30 and 6:00 P.M.,
Malinski confessed. He was kept in the hotel for three more
days. Then he made another confession. Finally he was arraigned.
No evidence of physical brutality was adduced. The Court's re-
versal of his conviction was based to a high degree on several
statements made by the prosecutor. The following is an excerpt
from justice Douglas' opinion in the case:
Prosecutor's statements . . we think are sufficient
... to establish that this confession was not made volun-
57322 U.S. 143, at 154 (1944).
58 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
tarily. He said that Malinski "was not hard to break."
that "He did not care what he did. He knew the cops
were going to break him down." and he added "Why
this talk about being undressed? Of course they had a
right to undress him to look for bullet scars and keep the
clothes off him. That was quite proper police procedure.
That is some more psychology-let him sit around with a
blanket on him, humiliate him there for awhile; let him
sit in the corner, let him think he is going to get a shel-
lacking." If we take the prosecutor at his word, the con-
fession of October 23rd was a product of fear-one on
which we could not permit a person to stand convicted
for a crime.59
The dissent from the majority opinion warned against making
the Fourteenth Amendment, "the instrument of reform of the
state officials." 0 0 Let this small voice could in no way detract
from the fact that the Ashcraft and Malinski decisions had made
the disciplining of state enforcement officers a primary objective
of the Court. Although the purpose of the Court's decisions in
the field was made apparent, a satisfactory definition of a
"coerced" confession had not been resolved.
In 1949, Watts v. Indiana,"' Turner v. Pennsylvania,2 and
Harris v. South Carolina climaxed the Court's use of the "in-
herently coercive" test. All three cases involved extensive periods
of questioning paralleling the factual situation of the Ashcraft
case. Penning the majority opinion in these cases, Justice Frank-
furter proceeded to give a detailed evaluation based on: the
absence of counsel, friend, or family; the length and mode of
interrogation; failure to arraign promptly and to inform the ac-
cused of his constitutional rights in finding that due process had
been denied. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas advocated
that all confessions obtained under unlawful detention be ex-
cluded, stating that unlawful detention breeds coerced confessions
and is the very root of the evil.
Within a short time, Justices Murphy and Rutledge died and
59 MalinskI v. New York, 324 U.S. at 406-407 (1945).
o Ibid. at 438.
61338 U.S. 49 (1949).
338 US. 62 (1949).
63 338 US. 68 (1949).
were replaced by Justices Clark and Minton. Murphy and Rut-
ledge had been part of the majority which followed the "in-
herently coercive" test as edified in the Asheraft case. With the
formation of a new unit, the Court reverted to a test predicated
on individual volition. In 1950, the Court denied certiorari in
Agoston v. Pennsylvania." This was the first inkling of the
denial of the Ashcraft rationale.
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 5 decided in 1951, found the Court
fully departing from the "inherent coercive" test and performing
a judicial ativism by returning to the rationale of the decisions
before Ashoraft. The Court made apparent the fact that con-
fession must be "truly" coerced. In the Gallegos case, a Mexican
alien, unable to speak English, was arrested in Texas and held
without counsel being afforded or friends being notified of his
detention. After a detention of four days, Gallegos confessed
to the murder of a lady friend in Nebraska. Four days later he
was taken to Nebraska and while there he again confessed. Six-
teen days after reaching Nebraska he was, at last, arraigned.
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Reed, the Court
upheld the conviction. The circumstances surrounding the de-
tention, although illegal, were not of the sort which evoke an
involuntary confession. Gallegos was free to choose, felt the
Court, in spite of the totality of circumstances involved.
Mr. Justice Jackson's idealogical aim as vocalized in the
Watts case was vindicated:
I doubt very much if... (the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights) require us to hold that the state may not
take into custody and question one suspected reasonably
of an unwitnessed murder. If it does, the people of this
country must discipline themselves to seeing their police
stand by helplessly while those suspected of murder
prowl about unmolested. Is it a necessary price to pay
for the fairness which we know as "due process of law"?
And if not a necessary one, should it be demanded by
this Court? I do not know the ultimate answer to these
questions; but, for the present, I should not increase the
handicap on society.""
64 340 U.S. 844 (1950).
65 342 U.S. 55 (1950).
66 Watt v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1949).
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Justice Douglas' principle, which was the rule in the federal
courts,67 became now a vociferously stinging, but ineffectual dis-
sent:
Detention without arraignment is a time honored
method for keeping an accused under the exclusive con-
trol of the police... We should unequivocally condemn
the procedure and stand ready to outlaw ... any con-
fession obtained during the period of the unlawful de-
tention. The procedure breeds coerced confessions. It
is the root of the evil. It is the procedure without which
the inquisition could not flourish in this country. 8
1953 found Justices Black and Douglas avidly calling for ex-.
clusion of confessions which were at all tainted, but the majority
of the court continued a policy of abstinence. The Court was
granting great leeway to the state in its criminal proceedings. In
Stein v. New York, 9 there was no evidence of physical coercion,
yet the issue of psychological coercion was submitted to-the trial
jury. By state statute, the jury was allowed to render a verdict
even if the confession was inadmissible. The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction, and stated affirmatively that "other evi-
dence" would sustain a conviction even if a confession was in-
admissible. Prior to the Stein case, the Court had held that a
coerced confession would void a conviction even if independent
evidence would support the verdict. The Stein case thus became
the zenith of a period in which the Court retreated from the many
inroads it had made into the field of state criminal procedure.
Yet, as though a rope of sand, this position has not held up
under the test of time. 1957 finds- the Court standing on a different
shore. In Fikes v. Alabama,"° a Negro, obviously uneducated and
termed "thick-headed" even by his own mother, was picked up on
a charge of burglary with intent to rape. No physical coercion
was used on the accused. No psychological coercion was ap-
parent. Following arrest, the accused was removed to the state
prison where he was detained for a week in isolation except for
sporadic questioning which was never of a prolonged nature.
6 rSee McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
68 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949).
6 346 US. 156 (1953).
70 352 US. 191 (1957).
Counsel and family were not allowed to see him, and the deten-
tion was contrary to Alabama state law. During his sojoum in
prison, Fikes confessed twice. Subsequently he was convicted by
the Alabama court. The Supreme Court of the United States
overruled the conviction stating that the Stein case in no way
impeded the result found. The Court, relying on the low mentali-
ty, the week long detention, and the failure to allow counsel to
confer with Fikes, felt that the encompassing circumstances were
so oppressive as to make the confession, in fact, coerced. Viewed
in the light of the Gallegos case and those subsequent, it is ap-
parent that a differently constituted Court is reverting to the
"subjectivily" coercive test. In the Gallegos case there was a de-
tention for twenty-five days of an illiterate Mexican who was
unable to speak English. Fikes was of low mentality and a Negro;
his detention was of far lesser duration. On its face, the circum-
stances in the Gallegos case would serve better to reach the results
determined in the Fikes case. Gallegos, however, was convicted.
It would appear that Chief Justice Earl Warren has joined the
Douglas clan which is attempting to have the McNabb Rule
transplanted to the Fourteenth Amendment.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan joined by Mr. Justice Reed and
Mr. Justice Burton review briefly the Court's stand from the
post-Ashcraft era through the Stein case, and clearly point up the
fact that the Fikes case is a new departure or at least a return to
the subjective principles applied before Ashcraft.
In dissent Mr. Justice Harlan said:
... In the absence of anything in the conduct of the
state authorities which "shocks the conscience" or does
"more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or
private sentimentalism about combating crime too ener-
getically, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, I think
that due regard for the division between state and federal
functions in the administration of criminal justice re-
quires that we let Alabama's judgment stand.71
In essence, the Court has paused in its oscillation and is closer
to the Douglas concept of a fair proceeding, with emphasis on
absolutist freedom, than to the Jacksonian (Justice Jackson)
71 ]bid. at 201.
theory which leans more to a policy of laissez-faire in allowing
the states to make their own rules as to how the "game" will be
played. This is the philosophy evident in Harlan's dissent.
It is apparent the Supreme Court has applied several rules in
the confession cases. Yet, by drawing these together, we are
afforded a present picture. The rule for 1957 would appear to be
able to be stated as follows: The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents the use of methods analogous to
torture in procuring confessions. Other confessions illegally ob-
tained will be allowed if there is not substantial evidence to prove
the circumstances surrounding the confession are coercive as
studied from the subjective viewpoint of the accused; that is, in
accord with his age, experience, mentality, and psychological con-
stitution. Each case, of course, must be decided on its own par-
ticular facts, and great emphasis must be placed on the personal
philosophies of the justices. A knowledge of their predilections
is necessary to an accurate prognosis. 2
D. Search, Seizures, and Sovereignty.
In colonial days, English customs officials, wishing to enhance
already magnified power, requested search warrants good for all
times and places so that they might search more fruitfully for
concealed contraband. It was these general writs of assistance
72 Fitting the Court's decisions in this area into the overall problem involving
federal control of state criminal procedure, we are faced with certain
facts which should dispel much of the criticism from those opposed to
having "obviously" guilty individuals' convictions quashed by the
Supreme Court on procedural "niceties". In Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295
U.S. 394 (1935), the defendant who had been sentenced to death for
rape had his conviction reversed by the Supreme Court on a pro-
cedural "technicality". In 1936, he was retried in the state court and
sentenced to life imprisonment. After the reversal by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1931), the defendants were
given a seven and one half year sentence for manslaughter by the state
court. Although the Supreme Court reversed the state court's conviction
in Chambers v. Florida, 309 US. 227 (1940), it was of no avail to
Chambers. He died in an insane asylum, as a result of a trial which
dragged on for seven years. In Canty v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 544 (1944),
the accused was given a sentence of life imprisonment by the state
court after his conviction had been reversed by the Supreme Court.
The coup de grace was Texas v. White, 309 U.S. 631, 310 U.S. 530
(1940). The Supreme Court had reversed White's conviction, but at
the remanded proceeding in the state court, the prosecutrix's husband
shot White to death. It is obvious that the accused is not going free on
procedural technicalities.
which the eminent James Otis protested so violently. The
customs officials asked the judges of the colonies to issue the writs.
A few justices in Massachusetts did; but on the whole, the others
refused.
From England, Attorney General William de Grey casti-
gated the colonial judges and demanded that the writs be issued.
Connecticut, New York, Maryland, Florida, and Georgia judges
refused to comply. In Virginia open strife broke out between
representatives of the Crown and the judges;, neither chastise-
ment, legal logic, or impeachment could sway the adamant judges.
Their stand was inculcated into Virginia's Declaration of Rights.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures would
seem to be innate in our legal system. But it seems, once having
resisted Great Britain on the issue, we were content to adopt the
common law rule that evidence obtained by illegal methods was
not objectionable. 73 In 1886, a lower federal court by authority
of a federal statute ordered an individual to produce certain docu-
ments bearing on a forfeiture proceeding. On appeal, the Supreme
Court ruled the statute unconstitutional by saying:
We have been unable to perceive that the seizure of
a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him
to be a witness against himself.j4
Subsequent cases in the federal courts followed this reasoning
in applying an exclusionary rule as to tainted evidence.75
In 1904 in Adams v. New York, 76 state officials seized certain
papers under a valid search warrant, but also seized some matter
not covered by the warrant. Assuming "arguendo" that the
Fourth Amendment applied to the state, the Court reverted to
the common law rule which allowed the admission of such evi-
dence.
7 8 Wigmore, Eidence, Sec. 2183 (3rd Ed.) (1940).
74 Boyd v. US., 116 US. 616,633 (1886).
75 Gouled v. US., 225 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. US., 225 US. 313 (1912);
Agnello v. U.S., 269 US. 20 (1925).
Ts 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
In 190877 and 1909,78 the Court again treated the problem
obliquely. 1914, however, found the Court meeting the problem
head on in federal and state areas. In Weeks v. U.S. 79 federal
officers performed an illegal search minus any warrant. Defendant
Weeks was convicted on the evidence. The Court reversed the
conviction saying:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized
and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment...
is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are con-
cerned might as well be stricken from the Constitution.80
The rationale of the Boyd series of cases was now shifted
from the Fifth to the Fourth Amendment. Here the emphasis was
to remain in the search and seizure cases. The Weeks case allowed
the defendant to replevy evidence and prevent its use even in-
directly."' The Supreme Court was acting as a deterrent to over-
zealous federal agents.
This rule of prophalaxis the Court would not extend to the
states. Speaking prior to Weeks, in 1914, the Court, in National
Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 2 stated that unreasonable searches and
seizures committed by the state and local officers violated no rights
of the individual as the Fourth Amendment had no application to
the states. The reticence of the Supreme Court to extend the
Weeks doctrine did not deter some states from venturing internal
reform. But a majority of the states continued common law tradi-
tion. The exclusionary rule was to find little support.
Before debating the merits of the two views of inclusion and
exclusion, let us look at later Supreme Court decisions. In Wolf
v. Colorado,8a the Court madly circled the May Pole. Speaking
for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared:
77 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
78 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 US. 322 (1909).
79 223 U.S. 383 (1914).
80 Id. at 393 (1914).
81 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US., 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
8 232 U.S. 58 (1914).
83 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary in-
trusion by the police which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment is basic to free society. It is therefore im-
plicit in "the concept of ordered liberty and as such
enforceable against the states through the due process
clause.94
Justice Frankfurter takes a dogmatic stand until he states that as
long as a state does not affirmatively sanction unreasonable searches
and seizures there is no violation of due process. This leaves room
for all searches and seizures which are not "officially" sanctioned;
evidence garnered in "unofficial" searches and seizures is not sub-
ject to the exclusion rule.
Mr. Justice Murphy felt in dissent that the majority had
reached its decision merely by polling the states as to what was
the majority rule and had not considered seriously due process
aspects. Justice Douglas along with Justices Murphy and Rutledge
spoke out for the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into
the Fourteenth, adhering to the views expressed in the Adamson
case. Ironically, Justice Black, who usually joins Justice Douglas,
concurred in the majority result on the grounds that the exclu-
sionary rule is merely a rule of evidence and not a command of
the Fourth Amendment. Though the Court was obviously not
a monolith of unity, the result remains that the states may use
evidence garnered as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure
just as they choose.
1951 found the Court again applying the Wolf doctrinePss
New Jersey State Police had unlawfully obtained evidence against
Stefanelli by unreasonable search and seizure. The Court in re-
fusing to enjoin the use of the evidence, said:
If we were to sanction this intervention, we would
expose every state criminal prosecution to unsupportable
disruption. Every question of procedural due process of
law, with its far flung and undefined range, would invite
a flanking movement against the system of state courts
by resort to the federal forum. 8
84 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
8 5 StefanefIi v. Minard, 342 US. 117 (1951).
86 Ibid. at 123.
Once again, the Court seemed to recognize the line of demarcation
between state and nation. Apparently, a period of halycon com-
promise had been reached. The dawning of a new day saw that
in reality peace was to once more turn to strife. In Rochin v.
California,7 state officials broke into the house of a known nar-
cotics peddler. Seeking to prevent confiscation of morphine
capsules as evidence, Rochin swallowed the capsules. A struggle
ensued in which the officers sought to make Rochin disgorge
the capsules. Finally by the use of a stomach pump, the capsules
were obtained and were instrumental in Rochin's conviction. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that such
acts by the officers were repulsive to due process. Verily, Justice
Holmes' "vomit" test applied. Though not based on freedom
from search and seizure, or self-incrimination, the case had ele-
ments of each. The Court evidenced the fact that it still was
"watching" the states as a somewhat benign "Big Brother."
1954 found the Court beset by another California case. In
Irvine v. California,88 evidence obtained by illegal search was ad-
mitted to perpetuate a conviction. The facts were as follows:
Police officers, in the absence of Irvine and his wife, arranged for
a locksmith to make a key to Irvine's home. On three separate
occasions the police without a warrant or process entered Irvine's
home to move their hidden microphone from hall, to bedroom, to
closet. Following the Wolf rationale, a bare majority upheld the
conviction distinguishing the Irvine case from the Rochin case on
the absence of coercion. Justice Clark, while concurring, chided
the Court for its ad hoc approach and pointed up the inadequacy
of a case to case approach. It is the ad hoc decision which
devastates stability and predictability. Justices Burton, Douglas
and Frankfurter dissented, all on essentially the same grounds.
Justice Black dissented on the grounds that in fact there had been
a coerced confession, calling forth a wealth of highly developed
reasoning, he made a cogent argument too lengthy to expound
upon. More in point for our purposes were the dissents of the
other justices. Excising the rationale of Rochin and juxtaposing
the Irvine situation, the dissenters point up apparent errors on
the part of the majority. The basis for adjudicating in Rochin
was as follows:
87 342 U.S. 165 (1951).
88 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
Regard for the requirements of the due process
clause inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of
judgment upon the whole course or proceedings in order
to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of the
English speaking peoples even toward those charged
with the most heinous offenses.3 9
Enumerating the particulars of the Irvine case, it is found that the
police:
(1) Secretly made a key to Irvine's house.
(2) By boring a hole in the roof of the house and using the
key they had to enter, they installed a secret microphone
connected with a listening post in a neighboring garage
where officers listened in relays.
(3) Using their key, they entered the house twice again to
move the microphone in order to cut out interference
from a fluorescent lamp. The first time they moved it
into Mr. and Mrs. Irvine's bedroom, and later into their
bedroom closet.
(4) Using their key, they entered the house on the night
of the arrest and in the course of the arrest made a
search for which they had no warrant.9
Standing alone, it is apparent that the Court is not applying the
Rocin doctrine. Let us, however, defer evaluation for the in-
troduction of another case.
In Breithaupt v. Abram,91 petitioner was convicted by a New
Mexico court of involuntary manslaughter as a result of an auto-
mobile collision. Evidence of the petitioner's inebriated condition
at the time of the accident was introduced at the trial. A blood
test made while the petitioner was unconscious was the basis of
the adverse evidence. Breithaupt urged that the conduct of the
state officers offended the "sense of justice" which the Court spoke
of in the Rochin case. Again, the Court distinguished away the
Rochin case on the ground of "brutality." Following its reasoning
89 342 U.S. at 169 (1951), quoting from Malinski v. New York, 324 US.
401 at 416-417 (1945).
90 347 U.S. at 145 (1954).
91 352 U.S. 403, 1 LEd2d 448 (1957).
in the Wolf case, the Court relied heavily on a poll of the states
as to the use of blood tests to ascertain alcoholic content of the
blood stream.92 Speaking of the "increasing slaughter" on the
highways, the Court, reasoning very sociologically, felt pressed
to uphold the conviction.
Having viewed Rochin, Irvine, and Breithaupt as exemplary
of the recent Supreme Court turmoil, some conclusions are forth-
coming. Rather than continue the tradition of due process so as
to allow for elasticity, the Court by strictures is forming its own
static definition. Its policy is preventive only of brutality. Simple-
minded methods of procuring evidence are disallowed, but state
officers are rewarded when they show intelligence in plying their
trade. Does due process mean only that you cannot be placed
on the rack? With science burgeoning as never before, police
are equipped with a myriad of technical devices to probe the
sanctity of the individual's home, mind, and body. The fact that
Breithaupt did not consent to the extraction of his blood is not
important says the Court. The state is privileged to assault the
body. This withdrawal of serum is not so far detached from the
possibility of the injection of another type of serum. How would
the court rule if a narcoanalysis were administered to a suspected
criminal and evidence as to his guilt were so adduced? Justices
Douglas, Black, and Warren would surely not sanction this, but
what of the rest of the Court? It would seem Rochin stands for
the principle that when one resists physically, he will be pro-
tected by the due process clause. Otherwise, according to the
Irvine and Breithaupt cases, the individual will suffer at the hands
of the state.
A host of recent articles viewed Rea v. U. S.93 as indicative
of a policy of intervention, by permitting aggrieved parties to
enjoin the use of evidence illegally seized by a federal agent from
use in a state prosecution.9 4 Many other sources have praised
state decisions in adopting the exclusionary rule. 5
92 See I L.Ed.2d 451-452 for extensive footnotes on this matter.
93 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
94 See Note, 35 N.C.L.Rev. 483 (1956).
95 The following have all adopted the exclusionary rule: Florida (Byrd v.
State, 80 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955)); Idaho (State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173,
258 P.2d 1147 (1953) (by implication)); Illinois (Chicago v. Lord, 7
Ill.2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955)); Indiana (Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307,
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Since the Wolf case, California96 and Delaware97 have
adopted the rule of exclusion by judicial decision. North Caro-
lina98 has reached the same result by statute.
California, no doubt as a result of the criticism of the Rochin
and Irvine cases, has gone further than the federal courts in
adopting a rule of exclusion.9 9 Federal courts require that the
defendant move for suppression of evidence before trial. 00 Cali-
fornia does away with this requirement' 01 Further, California
does away with the requirement of "standing" in that the de-
fendant may have evidence excluded whether the property
searched was his or that of another party. California is reacting
to its own personal excesses as previously limelighted.
In view of the reticence of a majority of states to adopt the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment will be strictly con-
strued. Read literally the Amendment does not specifically call
for exclusion, exclusion being the natural corollary of the man-
dates against unreasonable search and seizure, the ukase should be
that the Amendment be considered as implying exclusion. How-
ever the states have a propensity to strict construction. Constitu-
tional history bears this out. If due process is to mean anything in
this area, reform must come from the states, not the Supreme
Court
119 N.E.2d 429 (1954)); Kentucky (Ross v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d
424 (Ky. 1955)); Michigan (People v. Taylor, 341 Mich. 570, 67 N.W.2d
698 (1954) (by implication)); Mississippi (Thompson v. State, 213 Miss.
325, 56 So.2d 808 (1952)); Missouri (State v. Clark, 259 S.W.2d 813
(Mo. 1953)); Oklahoma (Leason v. State, 286 P.2d 288 (Okla. Crim.
1955)); Tennessee (Reinhart v. State, 193 Tenn. 15, 241 S.W.2d 854
(1951) (by implication)); Washington (State v. Robbins, 37 Wash.2d
431, 432, 224 P.2d 345, 346 (1950) (dictum)); Wisconsin (Potman v.
State, 259 Wis. 234, 242-43, 47 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1951) (dictum)).
98People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
97 Rickards v. State, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950).
98 N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 15-27 (1953).
99 See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). For an excellent
discussion of the case see Barret, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Searcbes-A Comment on People v. Caban, 43 Calif.,.Rev. 565
(1955).
100 See Edwards, Seasonable Protests Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 37 Minn.L.Rev. 188 (1953).
101 People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459, 282 P.2d 504 (1955).
E. The Right to Counsel.
Although there are many rights afforded the accused in a
criminal proceeding, there is none so pervasive as his right to
counsel. The discern of capable counsel is absolutely necessary if
the accused is to be fully protected. Untutored in the law, the
accused may readily fall victim to the intricacies of procedure
and practice, the niceties of which he has no comprehension.
Procedural rules set the time for raising issues and the mode of the
presentation of pertinent evidence on behalf of the accused. If
the accused's essential points of argument are not propounded,
they are usually deemed to have been waived. No layman is, in
truth, capable of conducting even a mediocre defense, as the
rules of procedure are designed for those familiar with the intri-
cacies of the legal proceeding.
Though our mother country, Great Britain, was derelict in
affording the right to counsel, twelve of the thirteen original
colonies granted the protection. The right is engrained in our
American system.
Men of means have always been able to procure counsel. Our
concern is with the individual of such penurious circumstances
that he cannot afford to pay for counsel. In what instances will he
be entitled to representation by a state appointed counsel?
The problem as set forth above did not reach the Supreme
Court until 1932. The famous Scottsboro cases became the Court's
stimuli to action.10 2 Two white girls, Ruby Bates and Victoria
Price, had been raped by nine Negro youths. All nine boys were
indicted by the grand jury. They were given no opportunity to
employ counsel and no attorney was appointed by the state until
the day of the trial. Seven of the nine defendants were convicted
as a result of a trial which aroused widespread national sentiment
and spurred liberal thinkers into a demand for legal reform. The
Supreme Court's reversal of the Alabama convictions jolted the
American Bar Association and others into an awareness of the
travesty of justice which was meted out in state tribunals.
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged that the right to the
assistance of counsel as guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment was
102 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); and Patterson v. Alabama, 302 U.S. 733 (1937).
of such fundamental importance, that, to a degree, it must be in-
corporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Limiting its holding
to capital cases, the Court asserted that when the defendant is
unable financially to employ counsel and is incapable of defending
himself because of ignorance, illiteracy, or other such impedi-
ments, it is the duty of the court to appoint counsel whether
requested or not. Further, counsel must be assigned in time to
be of real service to the accused party. Failing explicitly to touch
on whether or not counsel was mandatory in less than capital
cases, the Court allowed the periphery to remain undefined.
In 1938, in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, z3 the Court con-
strued the Sixth Amendment as applicable to all federal criminal
prosecutions, thus requiring counsel for the accused where he has
not intentionally waived his right to counsel with full knowledge
of the consequences. With this rule it appeared the Court would
calk up any chinks in the Scottsboro decisions.
But following closely on the heels of the opinion in Johnson
v. Zerbst came Avery v. Alabama.'" In this latter case, the Court
sustained a murder conviction where the accused had been af-
forded counsel but three days before the trial, hardly adequate
time for preparation of a real defense to a murder prosecution.
In its opinion, the Court voiced its reticence to interfere in the
state criminal procedure. A year later, in Smith v. O'Grady,"'5
the Court apparently filled in the void of the Scottsboro cases.
Albert Smith had received a twenty year sentence after pleading
guilty to a charge of burglary with explosives. In Nebraska, the
crime was punishable up to life imprisonment. Denial of right to
counsel in the case was held to be a deprivation of due process
even though the crime was not a capital offense. The Court
seemed to be following Johnson v. Zerbst, a logical method
geared to the preservation of a truly fair trial.
In 1942, however, another shift ensued. In Betts v. Brady, 08
the accused was indicted for robbery in Carroll County, Mary-
land. Betts was an itinerant farm laborer, at that moment without
work and on relief. He could not afford counsel. Upon arraign-
303 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
104 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
1o5 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
106 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
ment, he so informed the trial judge and requested that counsel
be appointed. The state court's policy was to grant counsel solely
in rape and murder cases. Betts' request was therefore denied.
Performing consistently with past tradition, the Court once
again detached itself from practicality by stating that:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the convic-
tion and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to
the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,
and while want of counsel in a particular case may re-
sult in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness
we cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexor-
able command that no trial for any offense or in any
court can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel... an as-
serted denial of due process is to be tested by an appraisal
of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may,
in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fair-
ness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may in
other circumstances, and in the light of other considera-
tions fall short of such denial. 1 °
Following the line espoused in the early coercion cases, the
Court was handing down ephemeral generalizations which set no
plumb standard to which the state courts must adhere. The "fair
trial" standard as stated in Betts v. Brady meant, succinctly, that
each case would be decided on its own particular facts: nothing
more, nothing less. Again Justices Douglas and Black dissented,
yearning for inclusion of the Sixth Amendment protection in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, having seemingly adopted the "fair trial"
standard, in Williams v. Kaiser'08 and Tomkins v. Missouri,10 9
non-capital cases, the Court relied entirely on the rationales of
Smith v. O'Grady and Powell v. Alabama, apparently holding the
Sixth Amendment to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
A layman is usually no match for the skilled prose-
cutor whom he confronts in the court room. He needs
107 Ibid. at 472-473.
108 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
109 323 US. 485 (1945).
the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of- overzealous
prosecutors, of the law's complexity, or of his own
ignorance or bewilderment. 0
In subsequent cases, the Betts rationale was conspicuous by
its abeyance, as the Court continued to follow the dictates it had
set forth in Williams v. Tomkins and other cases."" Unheralded
but obviously controlling, the Betts rationale returned in 1946.
In Carter v. Illinois,112 a totally deficient record included merely
the indictment, the plea of guilty to a charge of murder, and
the judgment in which there was a protracted recital of the
effect that the accused had been advised of his right to counsel.
Yet, he alone made his plea. Emphasizing the inadequacy of the
record, the Court held that no inference of inability to make
an intelligent waiver of counsel could be drawn.
Applying the "fair trial" rationale in De Meerleer v. Michi-
gan,"1 3 a unanimous Court held that arraignment, trial, conviction
of murder, and sentence to life imprisonment, all on the same
day, of a seventeen year old boy, without legal assistance and
without being advised of a right to counsel, clearly was violative
of due process.
Several cases following De Meerleer addended evidence to the
conclusion that the Court was reviving the "fair trial" doctrine.
In Foster v. Illinois,"4 the Supreme Court ruled that although the
trial court had not explicitly offered defendants, age thirty-four
and fifty-eight respectively, counsel, the trial court's warning as to
the possible consequences of their pleading guilty to charges of
burglary and larceny without legal aid was sufficient to make the
hearing consistent with the "fair trial" standard. Reiterating its
previous stand, the Court declared that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "exacts from the states a conception
of fundamental justice" which is satisfied neither by "merely
formal procedural correctness, nor... confined by any absolute,
rule such as that which the Sixth Amendment contains in se-
110 323 US. 471, 476 (1945).
"'1See House v. Mayo, 324 US. 42 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 US. 760
(1945); Hawk v. Olsen, 326 US. 271 (1945).
112 329 US. 173 (1946).
"13 329 US. 663 (1947).
"4 332 US. 134 (1947).
curing the accused (in federal prosecutions) the assistance of
counsel for his defense." 115
One year later in Haley v. Ohio,1 6 the Court, continuing to
apply the Betts v. Brady "test", negated the conviction of a
fifteen year old Negro boy who had not been advised of his
right to counsel. Subsequent cases followed the same trend up to
and including Uveges v. Pennsylvania."7 The Uveges case seems
to epitomize the views expressed by the Court, and state the law
as it is today nearly ten years later. The Court's opinion set forth
the following:
Some members of the Court think that where serious
offenses are charged, failure of a court to offer counsel
in state criminal trials deprives an accused of rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. (This is the Douglas-
Black minority) They are convinced that the services
of counsel to protect the accused are guaranteed by the
Constitution in every sense. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640 dissent 677-679, Only when the accused refuses
counsel with an understanding of his rights can the
Court dispense with counsel. Others of us think that
when a crime subject to capital punishment is not in-
volved, each case depends on its own facts. (Majority
view) See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462. Where the
gravity of the crime and other factors-such as age and
education of the defendants, the conduct of the court
or the prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature
of the offense charged and the possible defenses thereto
-render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to
result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair, the
latter group (majority) holds that the accused must
have legal assistance under the amendment whether he
pleads guilty or elects to stand trial, whether he requests
counsel or not."8
The summation of the Court in the Uveges case merely af-
firms with certitude the old adage that due process is not a mathe-
115 332 US. 134, 136 (1947). And see Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145
(1947).
116 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
117 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
118 Ibid.
matical formula. It is elastic as opposed to static. It is, for the
Supreme Court, a pragmatic tool with which to fashion judicial
handiwork, adapted to best serving justice in each case.
Unlike the results of the "coerced confession" cases, the
Court, it seems, has been more successful in inducing the states
to afford counsel to the indigent.119
While generalities failed in handing down the "coercion"
decisions, they have succeeded in bringing about reform in the
states in the "right to counsel" area. 20 A preponderance of
evidence points to a successful practice by the Supreme Court
in this area of due process. Success here is almost unparalleled in
any other area of the criminal proceeding; and most properly so,
for the right to counsel is the cornerstone of an adequate defense.
F. Trial by Jury.
In an article written in 1887 by Justice Samuel F. Miller, a
member of the Supreme Court, a classic statement of the place of
the jury in criminal cases is given:
In this class of cases there is no personal controversy
between one man and the other, but the government of
the country, undertaking for the general good of the
community to enforce the penalties prescribed by law
119 Newman, The Law of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (1949). In this
treatise, the requirements of the states are summarized as follows:
Statutes requiring that indigent defendants in non-capital as well as
capital criminal cases be provided with counsel on request exist in
twenty-five states-Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoning. Georgia and Kentucky require appointment of counsel in
all criminal cases by constitutional amendment. In Connecticut, Florida,
Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin, court decisions have established the requirement that in all felonies
or criminal cases punishable by imprisonment for several years indigent
defendants must be provided with counsel on request. [p. 70.1
120 The probable answer lies in the innately different nature of the two
fields. Court room practice is open, while pre-trial detention is a secre-
tive process. Public attendance of lawyers and laymen at the trial is
a stimulant which forces the judge to do his best, while the police
within their concrete bunkers have little to control them in their
conduct. Judges, moreover, are more often aware of Supreme Court
ukases, than are the members of the constabulary.
for offenses against the general welfare, brings all its
powers, its paid officers, the fund of its treasury, and
the common sentiment of the community to bear against
a single individual charged with a crime. The dispropor-
tion of means to sustain the respective sides of such a
controversy is very obvious, and has long been felt
The heaviness and severity of the penalty, the impos-
sibility of making reparation if the verdict and judgment
of the court against the accused is erroneous, have
infused into the spirit of the English law the general
proposition that a defendant under such circumstances
should be dealt with in such a manner as to secure all
his rights and to protect him from possible injustice.
This view is often expressed in charges of the court to
the jury, which, though not strictly law, have been
made the rule of action for juries in an immense number
of cases,-that it is better that nine guilty men should
escape than that one innocent man should be punished.
In accordance, with this, general proposition, it is
my opinion that the principle of the jury system which
requires an unanimity in the jury to make valid its
verdict in criminal cases, is a sound one. I believe that
no man should be rendered infamous by a judgment of
a court, or punished in any other manner under a penal
statute, unless twelve men are satisfied that he is guilty
of the matter charged against him. As all judicial punish-
ment is rather intended as an admonition for the suppres-
sion of crime, and to prevent the commission of like
offenses in future, than as a retribution for the one on
trial, it is wise that the community should have that
confidence that -the man so punished for its benefit was
guilty, which arises from the concurrence of the opinion
of twelve good and lawful jurors, and that no man should
be convicted where even one juror has a reasonable
doubt of his guilt.' 2'
Justice Miller knew full well that the jury was the reflection
of the mores and attitudes of the society from which it was
drawn. It was a means of ameliorating the harshness of the law.
Later Supreme Court Justices, however, have not felt that trial
by jury is so fundamental as to be necessary to a fair trial, within
the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
121 Justice Miller noted in 21 Amerl.LRev. 859, 865-866 (1887).
In Maxwell v. Dow,'- it was contended that the right to
trial by a common law jury of twelve men in criminal cases was
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Basing its decision
on Hurtado v. California,"'- the Court rejected the contention,
and stated that the due process clause did not incorporate all the
rules of procedural protection rooted in English legal history.
Thus, unanimity in a jury verdict may be dispensed with.- 4 In
fact, juries may be dispensed with in lesser criminal cases and the
traditional twelve are -not mandatory in capital cases, Even_ in a
capital case, jury trial may be dispensed with when one pleads
guilty to a charge of murder, though the degree of murder is
yet to be ascertained. 25
But when a jury is required by law, its selection must be
made in a reasonable maanner"-( The requirement of reasonable
selection, however, has been leniently construed. In Fay v. New
York, 27 and Moore v. New York, 28 the Supreme Court upheld
the use of "blue ribbon juries" by a five to four vote. In accord
with New York Judiciary Law Sec. 749-aa 3, the jury had ap-
peared personally and had sworn under oath to their qualifications.
This type jury was the norm in all counties of the state having
more than one million inhabitants. Use of such juries is at the
discretion of the trial judge on application of either plaintiff or
defendant. Evidence was adduced to show that the "blue ribbon
juries" were composed of white collar classes, while manual
laborers were excluded. Further, studies showed such juries were
prone to convict more often than the usual jury.- 9 Nevertheless,
the Court upheld the use of the jury on the ground that the
process of selection was not odious to our system of law.
Finding such juries anathema, Justice Murphy in dissent said:
122 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
= 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
124 Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912).
"25 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
126 Brown v. N. J, 175 U.S. 172 (1899).
12 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
128 333 U.S. 565 (1948).
129 See Fourth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the state of New
York, (1938). In the years 1933 and 1934, "blue ribbon juries" brought
in convictions in homicide cases 82.5% of the time, as compared with
a 40% rate for other juries.
There is no constitutional right to a jury drawn
from a group of uneducated and unintelligent persons.
Nor is there any right to a jury chosen solely from those
at the lower end of the economic and social scale. But
there is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a
group which represents a cross-section of the community
Under our Constitution the jury is not to be made
the representative of the most intelligent, the most
wealthy, or the most successful, nor of the least intelli-
gent, the least wealthy, or the least successful. It is a
democratic institution, representative of all qualified
classes of people.130
Thus, though not always unanimous in decision, the Supreme
Court has seen fit not to intrude upon state domain in this area.
Fortunately, the states realize the salutary function of the jury,
and in most cases preserve its fundamental components.' 3 '
G. Presence of the Accused, Right to a Public Trial, and
The Necessity of an Impartial Tribunal.
Whether or not the protection of the Sixth Amendment in
regard to presence of the accused at his trial is operative upon
the states is a question, as yet, not clearly answered. In 1882, by
way of dictum, the Court said:
The personal presence of the accused, from the be-
ginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving life
or liberty, as well as at the time final judgment is
rendered against him may be and must be assumed to
be, vital to the proper conduct of his defense, and
cannot be dispensed with.13 2
Fourteen years later the Court took a different stand. A Ken-
tucky court allowed a juror, whose discharge had been asked for
prior to his being sworn, to be questioned in the absence of the
accused and his counsel. The Supreme Court sustained the Ken-
13 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 at 299 (1947).
131 Reference may be had to instances when the states have discriminated as
to selection by race. The Court in these instances, consistent with the
"equal protection" doctrine has ruled against the state. See Aldis v.
Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
132 Schwab v. Berggen, 143 US. 442, 448 (1892).
tucky tribunal, as no substantial interest of the defendant was
impinged upon. 3 3 The same year, the Court was faced with an
extraordinary situation. The defendant in Felts v. Murphy 34
was so deaf that he was unable to hear any of the testimony.
Making further inroads on the Sixth Amendment guarantees, the
Court held that as long as accused had counsel to conduct his
defense, he was not deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law.
Nine years later, in Frank v. Magnum,-35 the Supreme Court
stated that the presence of the defendant is not essential at the
time the verdict is rendered. His absence would not be contrary
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Snyder v. Massachusetts,36 the Court, acknowledging that
it had never before held so, said that the Fourteenth Amendment
does require substantial compliance with the guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment. In decision, the Court evolved the following
formula:
In a prosecution for a felony, the defendant has the
privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present
in his own person whenever his presence has a relation,
reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity
to defend against the charge... The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not assume to a defendant the privilege to be
present (when) . . . presence would be useless, or the
benefit but a shadow... The presence of the defendant
is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair
and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence and
to that extent only. 37
The rule as stated in the Snyder case has inured and endured
to the present.' 88 It is but exemplary of judicial pragmatism at
its zenith.
183 Howard v. Kentucky, 200 US. 164 (1906).
134 201 U.S. 123 (1906).
135 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
136 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
137291 US. 97, 105, 107, 108, 118 (1934).
138 In Chesman v. Teets, 77 S.Ct. 1127 (1957), the principle of the Snyder
case was again affirmed. This 1957 decision required that the accused
be present when a settlement of the trial transcript was to be made.
The particulars seemed to indicate that the transcript was improperly
constituted.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a "public" trial.
Proceedings in camera, as were known to France and Spain, are
anathema to our system. Holding one "incommunicado, trying
him in secret, and executing sentence under such circumstances"
would never be allowed. The open court door prevents short-
cuts by zealous prosecutors. Thus, when a Michigan judge, sitting
as a one man jury, sentenced a witness for contempt, the Supreme
Court quashed the conviction. The Fourteenth Amendment for-
bids the sentencing of an accused person without a public trial.
Everyone is entitled to his day in court.h 9
The right to a public trial is not the right to a "lynching
bee." A public trial in such an atmosphere would be contrary to
due process. Due process demands impartiality. Such is lacking
when either judge or jury are dominated by a mob. "If the jury
is intimidated and the trial judge yields, so that there is an actual
interference with the course of justice, there is, in that Court,
a departure from due process." 140 Further, due process is not
adhered to when the trial judge is compensated through the
medium of the fines he imposes.141
In summation, it is obvious that the accused is guaranteed
that he be present at any activity which requires his participation,
that his trial be in public, and that the tribunal before which he
stands be truly impartial.
H. Double Jeopardy.
Anne Redfearne was tried and acquitted of witchcraft in
Lancashire, England. Public sentiment ran high against the de-
cision. Flaccid judges capitulated and another trial was had. This
time a conviction was handed down. The year was 1612; the
principle of double jeopardy had been previously established. 142
Anglo-American legal history is replete with the injustices
worked when the prosecution is allowed to continually bring
one before a tribunal unfettered by the principle of double
jeopardy. Though recognizing the innate danger of not adhering
139 In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
14OFrank v. Magnum, 237 US. 309, 335; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 89
(1923).
141 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US. 510 (1927).
42 Douglas, W. 0, An Almanac of Liberty, p. 143 (1954).
to the principle, the Supreme Court of the United States has
never found existent a situation in a state proceeding so opposed
to the concept of ordered liberty as to necessitate the calling forth
of the principle.
Thus, in Dreyer v. Illinois,'4 the Supreme Court declared
that retrial after discharge of a hung jury did not subject the
defendant to double jeopardy. Further, a subsequent trial might
be had where the accused's conviction had been adjudged a nullity
on appeal even though he had already spent time in jal on the
void conviction.'"
In Palko v. Connecticut,45 the Court reached a decision
which was to set the standard for today. By the terms of a Con-
necticut statute, the state was privileged to appeal questions of
law arising in a criminal trial. Palko had been freed by the trial
court; but on appeal, the state obtained a reversal, again prosecuted
the defendant, and got a verdict of first degree murder. Palko
contended that the retrial violated the double jeopardy provision
of the Fifth Amendment. Eight justices agreed that the statute
did not subject Palko to such double jeopardy "so acute and
shocking that our policy will not endure it." 146 The test as
enunciated in the Palko case was aimed -at preserving our ordered
scheme of liberty. This state of ordered liberty, the Court held,
had not been disturbed by the actions of the sovereign state of
Connecticut.
In its most recent holding on the subject, the case of Brock v.
North Carolina,4 the Court followed the Palko rationale and
found no violation of due process.
From the above, it would seem that the prohibition against
double jeopardy is sadly deleted, and is tantamount to being in-
applicable to the forty-eight states.
I. Conviction Based on Tainted Testimony.
Tom Mooney spent eighteen years in prison before his ap-
14 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
144 Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); and Shoener v. Pennsyl-
vania, 207 US. 188 (1907).
'45 302 I.S. 319 (1907).
14' Ibid.
34T 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
plication for habeas corpus reached the ears of the Supreme
Court In disposing of the petition and upholding Mooney's con-
viction, the Court by way of dictum stated that a conviction based
on perjured testimony was anathema to the concept of due process.
Due process is not served, "if a state has contrived a conviction
through the pretense of a trial which is, in truth, but used as
a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured." 14
In 1942, the Court was again faced with problems of a
similar nature. In Hysler v. Florida,149 the accused filed a petition
supported by affidavits contending that his codefendant had been
forced to testify falsely at his trial. The testimony was clearly
detrimental to Hysler's interest. The Supreme Court, on inde-
pendent examination of the affidavits, found that:
in the course of... years witnesses die or disappear,
that memories fade, that a sense of responsibility may
become attenuated, that . . . on the eve of execution
(an auto da fe) not unfamiliar as a means of relieving
others...150
In Pyle v. Kansas,'5' the Court found a fact situation to
which the dictum of the Mooney case might be applied. The
Court reversed the state court's refusal to issue habeas corpus.
Three years later the Court, in White v. Ragen,15 2 declared that
testimony procured by bribery was a violation of constitutional
rights.
The dictum in the Mooney case has inured into true judicial
precedent In 1957 the Court again relied on the dictum. Peti-
tioner in Alcorta v. State5 3 was indicted for murder of his wife
148Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). Mooney's petition was
denied as he" had not exhausted all available remedies of his home state,
California. In 1937, a California court ruled against his claim, 10 Cal.2d
1, 73 P.2d 554 (1937). The Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari in 1938. 305 U.S. 598 (1938); Mooney was eventually
pardoned by the governor of California.
'49 315 U.S. 411 (1942).
160 Ibid. at 413, 421-122.
151 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
1 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
1578 S.Ct. 103 (1957).
in a Texas state court. Alcorta admitted the killing but contended
it occurred in a fit of passion when he encountered his wife
kissing one Castilleja in a parked car. Petitioner relied upon a
statute which limited prison terms to a five year maximum when
murder was devoid of malice and the act was the result of sudden
passion arising from adequate cause.
Castilleja, the state's eye witness, in response to inquiries by
the prosecutor as to his relationship with accused's wife, stated that
their acquaintance was purely casual. Subsequent to Alcorta's
conviction, Castilleja came forward and declared his testimony to
be false. Alcorta sought habeas corpus. At the hearing on the
petition, the prosecutor admitted that he had suppressed Castilleja's
statement that he had had sexual intercourse with Alcorta's wife
on several occasions. The state court denied habeas corpus. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. In its
opinion, the Court stated the following:
Under the general principles laid down by this Court
in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79
L.Ed. 791, and Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63
S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214, petitioner was not accorded due
process of law. It cannot seriously be disputed that Cas-
tilej a's testimony, taken as a whole, gave the jury the
false impression that his relationship with petitioner's
wife was nothing more than that of a casual friendship.
This testimony was elicited by the prosecutor who knew
of the illicit intercourse between Castilleja and peti-
tioner's wife. Undoubtedly Castilleja's testimony was
seriously prejudicial to petitioner. It tended squarely to
refute his claim that he had adequate cause for a surge
of "sudden passion" in which he killed his wife. If
Castilleja's relationship with petitioner's wife had been
tuly portrayed to the jury, it would have, apart from
impeaching his credibility, tended to corroborate peti-
tioner's contention that he had found his wife embracing
Castilleja. If petitioner's defense had been accepted by
the jury,as it might well have been if Castilleja had not
been allowed to testify falsely, to the knowledge of the
prosecutor, his offense would have been reduced to
"murder without malice" precluding the death penalty
now imposed upon him.' 4
1S78 S.Ct. 103, 105 (1957).
From this recent declamation, it is evident that the Court
will not sanction convictions founded on tainted testimony. The
prosecution must not allow zeal to replace the fundamental tenets
of justice; Alcorta v. State is but another example of the use of
means which besmirch the pristine gown of the maid of justice.
The Supreme Court has and is invoking the provisions of due
process in a constant attempt to insure that excessive zeal be not
considered more important than justice in state proceedings.
J. Post-Conviction Corrective Procedure and the Habeas Corpus
Dilemma.
New trials, rehearings, and appeals are not necessary to ac-
cord the accused due process. The Constitution does not prevent
a state from making a single tribunal the final arbiter of legal
issues. Consequently, review by an appellate court in a criminal
case is wholly within the discretion of the state.'55
Yet, if the state tribunal of first instance fails to accord due
process, it is incumbent upon the state to afford corrective process.
This principle was aptly stated in Mooney v. Holohan.1 6 In
general, a majority of states have complied with Supreme Court
fiat. Many states have expanded the writ of coram nobis,57
Others have acted through the venerated writ of habeas corpus.18
The remainder of those in compliance have either allowed mo-
tions to vacate a conviction on constitutional grounds at any
time,15 9 permitted motions for new trial long after judgment, 0
or set up statutory post-conviction remedies.'10
At present, the Commission of Uniform Laws has recom-
mended the adoption of The Unifoim Post-Conviction Procedure
Act.'a1
On the whole, the response of the state courts has been good.
However, the issue of corrective process melts into a grey area
155Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177
U.S. 155 (1900); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 ('1903).
156 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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5 7 See Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909 (1944).
158 See People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949).
109 State v. Magrum, 768 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949).
'0 People v. Henderson, 343 Mich. 465, 72 N.W.2d 177 (1955).
161 North Carolina General Statutes, Sees. 15-217, 217-222 (1953).
8 2 See Note, 69 Harvard Law Review 1289 (1956).
which adds fuel to the state-federal inferno. The particular
grounds of strife is the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal
courts. A plethora of habeas corpus petitions have deluged federal
courts within the last few years. Out of 4,849 federal question
habeas corpus cases handled from 1946 through 1954, petitioners
were successful on 77 occasions, or in 1.6% of the cases.,"
State devotees contend that the recent excesses are due to the
expansion of the writ of the Supreme Court. Contrary evidence
would seem to show the flood of petitions is a result of the state
prison practices. By way of example, until 1944, few petitions
came from the state of Illinois. Curiously, 1944 was the year in
which a tight web of prison censorship was broken up in the
state. 0 4 As of the moment, 20% of all habeas corpus petitions
came from Illinois.165 Comtemporaneous cases show that such
prison practices were widespread."6
Asserted antipathy to federal review of the highest state
courts contains elements of personal narcissicism and justifiable
claims of additional paper work. These feelings have been trans-
posed into the reality of House of Representative Bill 5649.67
In essence, the bill attempts to make state decisions res adjudicata
and subject to review only by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The bill presumes that there is adequate post-conviction
corrective procedure. The major problem is not one of merit,
rather one of cumbersome paper work brought on by the deluge
of petitions. A solution does not appear well grounded in H.R.
5649. Lower federal court review, via the writ of habeas corpus,
is necessary, by dint of sheer volume. The Supreme Court alone
could not do justice to even a slim minority of petitions. In a
system which professes to place the protection of the innocent
above the conviction of the guilty,. it would seem mandatory
that the lower federal courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction.
A solution to the problem might lie in the screening of the
petition by special commissioners, but apparently such a screening
103 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 5649, 84th Congress, First Session, 34 (1955).
164 See U.S. ex rel Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F.Supp. 973 (1944), affirmed
146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), certiorari denied, 325 US. 865 (1945).
165 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on HR. 5649, 84th Congress, First Session 34 (1955).
268 See Warfield v. Raymond, 195 Md. 711, 71 A.2d 870 (1950).
167 84th Congress, First Session (1955).
could not take place outside the judicial system.1 8 Adequate
screening procedure plus a provision not making state appearance
necessary at the original hearing of the petition would serve to
reduce the burden upon the state. Though but a skeleton outline
for an effectual system, the above proposal appears more sub-
stantial than the panacea of H.R. 5649.
K. Conclusion and General Consideration of the Problem.
Up to this point, the essential elements of the criminal pro-
ceeding have been covered in particularized detail. The concept
of due process has been discussed, and it has been demonstrated
that federal intervention in state procedure has created a situation.
I do not say a problem. The problem may not as yet be upon us.
It is clear that the Supreme Court has spear-headed a drive
which has enlarged substantially federal control of state criminal
proceedings. Yet, has there been truly constructive progress, or
has merely an illusion of advancement been fashioned? Is the
only thread in this history the conflict of men and ideas? Optim-
ists can muster authority to bolster the banner of progress. Since
1923, the Supreme Court has found that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the following pro-
tections:
(1) The states must draft statutes of such clarity as to in-
form the individual of what conduct is considered
crininal.1e9
(2) The assistance of defense counsel must be granted when
circumstances show counsel is needed.170
(3) The jury must be free from intimidation. 7 1
(4) The judge must be impartial. 172
(5) Evidence obtained by coerced confession is inadmis-
sible.173
(6) The prosecutor must not suppress evidence. 74
1l8Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
169 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
170 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
171 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
17 2 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
173 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
174 Alcorta v. State, 78 S.Ct. 103 (1957).
(7) Adequate post-conviction remedies must be available.'"
Substantial evidence, however, can be found on the side of
the pessimists. The first eight amendments to the Constitution
contain approximately twenty-five guarantees of liberty to the
individual. Seventeen of the twenty-five relate to the criminal
proceeding. Few of the seventeen have been considerd so funda-
mental as to require their inclusion in the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. A state may, without fear of
violating the fiat of the Constitution:
(1) ignore the procedure of indictment by grand jury;1 70
(2) require compulsory self-incrimination; 17
(3) deny trial by jury; 78
(4) receive evidence in the absence of the accused;179
(5) put one in jeopardy of his life, twice for the same of-
fense;i8 0
(6) use evidence which is garnered as the result of an illegal
search and seizure.' 8 '
Pessimists may cite, most properly, the lack of reform of
state criminal procedure from within. The reform by California in
the area of search and seizure is conspicuous in that it is merely
one bright light among a host of darkened lamps. Vegetating
daily, the proposed Uniform Post-Conviction Act has had slight
influence. The time-enervated pleas of Justice Douglas have not
vibrated upon the auricles of the states. Although not carrying
the field completely, the critique of the pessimists seems to be well
founded when one follows the cases from 1920 until the present.
Progress has not been insubstantial, but by comparison with
kinetic potential, the influence of the Supreme Court is not of
appropriate latitude.
Intervention by the Supreme Court has been criticized on
several grounds. The lay public, generally unconcerned with
175 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US. 103 (1935).
17B Hurtado v. California, 110 US. 516 (1884).
'"7Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
178 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
1 9 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
-so Brock v. North Carolina, 344 US. 424 (1953).
181 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
unglamorous procedure, and not realizing how procedural guaran-
tees protect substantive rights, castigates the court for returning
recidivists to society. This belief is palpably erroneous. The fate
of the defendants in the "coercion cases" shows that upon remand
to state tribunals, the accused is reconvicted without the pro-
cedural error of the original trial. An informal survey has shown
this to be true in other areas. Only one defendant, Gustave
Uverges,18 2 out of many was allowed to go free. He was released
because he had spent many years in prison before the case was
remanded by the Supreme Court. 83 Decisions of the Supreme
Court have rarely freed a man from the grasp of the state.
Resistance to federal intervention in state criminal proceed-
ings has been organized on a professional level. Both the National
Association of Attorneys General and the Conference of Chief
Justices have voiced disapproval of what has been the federal
policy.8 4 Opposition from the states should be predicated basical-
ly on a desire to reduce the ponderous burden of work made
necessary by the result of a deluge of application for habeas corpus
and the practicality of perpetuating police efficiency. Statistics
show that very few applicants are successful in comparison with
the volume of supplications. There is, in truth, a problem, but
an answer does not lie in the one-sided predictions of the repre-
sentatives of the states. By way of illustration as to these prefer-
ences-a resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices adopted
in 1952:
Orderly federal procedure under our dual system
of government should require that a final judgment of
18 2 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 US. 437 (1948).
183 Letter from Judge William Rahauser, former District Attorney, Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, to this writer. Mr. Rahauser argued the States'
case in Uveges v. Pennsylvania.
184 1954 saw their vocalizations reach legal manifestation when forty-one
attorneys general joined in a brief attacking the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, c.
28, Sec. 1, 14 Star. 385, which granted federal courts the right to issue
writs of habeas corpus, on the grounds that the act violated the 11th
Amendment in allowing a suit against the state and further involves the
use of method of trying fact unknown to the common law. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected both contentions and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. U.S. ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213
F.2d 922 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 348 Us. 851 (1954).
a state's highest court be subject to review or reversal
only by the Supreme Court of the United States. 85
Clearly every man wishes his word to be final. The interest of
the justices is with the maintenance of their authority as final
arbiters. All of us are possessed of a pride of similar nature, but
we must recognize that in certain situations of a fundamental
nature, there is a higher authority. The answer to the problem
is not in the opinions of the states avant guarde.
Criticism of the Supreme Court by state officials has no
doubt prevented the formulation of a clear cut doctrine. Even
more so, the Court's own division has been responsible for the
dearth of a real policy. Oscillation and vacillation have rendered
the Court often effete. 1957 is characteristic of the historical
trend. In Fikes v. Alabama, 86 the Court quashed a state con-
viction as the confession of the accused was considered coerced.
No physical violation of body or mental dignity was apparent.
By contrast, in Breithaupt v. Abram,18 T the Court allowed state
officers to withdraw blood from the accused without prior con-
sent and to introduce an analysis of the blood as evidence on
which a conviction was had. Patentiy, the assault on Breithaupt
is more inconsistent with the principles of due process than Fikes'
detention. These two decisions can only be interpreted with
reference to the personal philosophy of the justices. Justices
Warren, Black, and Douglas can be relied upon to protect indi-
vidual dignities; while Justices Frankfurter, Brennan, Reed, Har-
lan, and Burton waiver from pole to pole depending upon the
particular facts of the case presented. The notorious Irvine case188
and others of similar demeanor serve to illustrate the validity of
the above statements.
Certain members of the Court foster a philosophy of laissez
faire, not wishing to interfere in the state's domain. Although
admirable from a purely political science viewpoint, the practi-
calities of the situation demand something more. If the Supreme
Court is to be of any reformative value, it must establish a con-
1s5 Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution on Habeas Corpus (Council of
State Governments) (1952).
180 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
187 352 US. 432 (1957).
188 347 US. 128 (1954).
sistent pattern of decision. Ad hoc decisis does not weigh heavily
on the states or compel them to establish satisfactory procedures.
The present situation find Sidney Sitizen, a second-rate burgher
in his own state, entitled to a minuscule of due process; while in
dealing with the federal government, he receives much greater
consideration. Should not the stringent rules of the federal courts
be imposed upon state tribunals? Partially contrary to the ac-
cused's interest is much more prevalent in state proceedings than
in federal criminal trials. Yet, the amount of protection afforded
the accused varies inversely with the prejudice he will be sub-
jected to. The time has come, it would appear, to solidify the
dissent in Adamson v. California'8s into law. The fundamental
protections of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment; and applicable federal decisions should
be followed to perfect an implementation. This is the natural
point of termination. Past equivocation has been both illogical and
ineffectual. It is the rare case which gets to the Supreme Court.
Thousands of injustices never reach that tribunal. True, many
of the acts complained of are not so deleterious as to shock the
collective sense of justice; yet the maintenance of procedural
regularity is fundamental to the criminal law. Without such
regularity, the accused is at the mercy of a prosecution heavily
bandoliered with a plethora of weapons.
Federal statutes exist which give citizens a cause of action
when state officers invade constitutionally protected rights.190
Several cases have arisen under such statutes.12 In the infamous
Screws' 92 case, the facts showed that the accused was bludgeoned
to death with a tire iron by state officials. The Supreme Court
quashed the conviction of the state officer on the grounds that
the statute required "specific intent" to deprive their victim of
constitutionally protected rights. Again, the Court was retreat-
ing from a policy Congress had established. The question is prop-
erly asked: Is the Supreme Court the party to bring about reform?
Being the highest court in the land, it would be the natural
authority, but may not it be necessary for Congress to perform
18 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
190 Rev. Stat. Sec. 1979 (1875); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 245
Supp. (1956).
191 See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Screws v. U.S., 325 US.
91 (1945).
"2 Screws v. U. S, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
the task? Immediately, many will contend that the representa-
tives of the states will never submit to fettering their constituency.
This, however, is an old hue and cry. Congress, certainly in other
fields, has sacrificed the state. Federal regulation of interstate
commerce is, to say the least, pervasive. Increased congressional
legislation might be the catalyst to voluntary action on the part
of the Court. If such voluntary action is not forthcoming the
function of policing state proceedings would certainly be ap-
propriately carried out by the Department of Justice. Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "the Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this Article." The power is there. It need only be used.
Any combination of action on the part of Congress and the
Supreme Court would be a welcomed solution to a grave problem.
If reform is not forthcoming from federal authority, the
burden again rests with the states. Quite conceivably the processes
of time may raise the level of state performance. Time has a way
of assuaging, but it must not be forgotten that pustules spread if
not lanced. If local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies
would carry the banner of reform, a point for state sovereignty
in the field would be cogently made.
